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ABSTRACT
I consider three views of the labor market. In the first, wages are flexible and employment follows
the principle of bilateral efficiency. Workers never lose their jobs because of sticky wages. In the
second view, wages are sticky and inefficient layoffs do occur. In the third, wages are also sticky,
but employment governance is efficient. I show that the behavior of flows in the labor market
strongly favors the third view. In the modern U.S. economy, recessions do not begin with a burst of
layoffs. Unemployment rises because jobs are hard to find, not because an unusual number of people







A standard view of recessions is that an adverse shock results in widespread layoffs
of workers from established employment relationships. In this view, workers lose
their jobs because wages are sticky and employers no longer ﬁnd the relationships
proﬁtable after the shock. High unemployment lasts until the bulge of unemployed
workers can ﬁnd new jobs.
I propose that the evidence supports quite a different view. An adverse shock
has little effect on established employment relationships, especially in the modern
market where collective bargaining affects few workers outside government. Jobs
end when it is in the mutual interest of worker and employer to part company.
A shock raises unemployment by lowering the proﬁtability of hiring new work-
ers. Unemployment rises not because of a bulge of layoffs but because workers
entering job search—from previous jobs, from school, and from home activities—
experience unusual difﬁculty in ﬁnding jobs.
As a preliminary matter, I observe that it is well known that job-ﬁnding rates
are far too high to match the persistence of unemployment following a recession
(Hall 1995, Cole and Rogerson 1999). The exit rate from unemployment is in the
range of 30 to 60 percent per month. If a recession started with a bulge of job
loss and lasted as long as it took for those workers to ﬁnd new jobs or leave the
labor force, unemployment would return to normal at 30 to 60 percent per month.
Instead, the reversion rate is about one percent per month. The market reaches its
stochastic equilibrium so quickly, in fact, that the movements of unemployment
can be understood in a model that neglects turnover dynamics and considers only
the stochastic steady states of the model.
The key fact supporting the central thesis of this paper is that, in the modern
economy, there is no bulge of job loss at the onset of a recession, or, for that matter,
atanytimeinthebusinesscycle. TheBureauofLaborStatistics’newJobOpenings
and Labor Turnover survey measures separation rates from the employer side and
demonstrates this fact conclusively. Separation rates declined during the recession
that began at the beginning of 2001. Although data from earlier recessions are
not available on the same footing, ﬂows of workers into unemployment are also
remarkably stable, especially in the past two recessions.
The movements of unemployment arise almost entirely from changes in the
2job-ﬁnding rate. The data do not speak as loudly on this point. The ﬂow of workers
into jobs is shown deﬁnitively to decline slightly during a recession in the new
employer turnover survey. With a declining ﬂow and higher unemployment, there
is a presumption that job-ﬁnding rates are lower in slack markets. But two factors
complicate the measurement of those rates. First, some workers who lose or leave
jobs move to new jobs without becoming unemployed at all. The likelihood of job-
to-job transitions without unemployment is higher in strong labor markets with low
unemployment, though the data on these transitions are weak. Second, people may
search actively while they are still holding jobs or while they are in school or out
of the labor force for other reasons. Despite these obstacles, it seems clear that
recessions are times of large declines in job-ﬁnding rates.
Research has been active in developing models of the labor market that come
to grips with these facts about the cyclical behavior of ﬂows. One important con-
tribution is the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) matching model (Diamond
1982, Mortensen 1982, Pissarides 1985). In that model, decisions about the forma-
tion and continuation of jobs are privately efﬁcient—they maximize the combined
value of the worker and the employer. This line of thinking rejects the earlier view
that workers are laid off in bad times because their rigid wages have become un-
realistic. Separations only occur when the worker gains more from leaving the
job than the employer loses. These efﬁcient matching models predict that the sep-
aration rate declines in recessions. The value of the option to search for a new
job declines when jobs become hard to ﬁnd and thus the efﬁcient outcome is the
continuation of jobs that might have ended in normal times.
As Shimer (2005) has pointed out, the DMP model cannot explain the magni-
tude of the rise in unemployment during a recession. The reason is that the model
takes the wage to be instantly ﬂexible. An adverse shock to proﬁtability results in
an immediately lower wage. Employers continue to recruit workers with almost
the same enthusiasm, because a lower wage almost completely absorbs the proﬁt
shock. Job searchers ﬁnd it almost as easy to ﬁnd new jobs, so the unemployment
rate rises only just above its normal level.
As I have proposed in a companion paper (Hall 2005), wage stickiness can
have an important role in an efﬁcient matching model. The search friction creates
a range of wages, the bargaining set, from the reservation wage of the worker at the
low end to the entire product of the worker at the upper end. As long as the wage is
3in this bargaining set, the match will be formed and continued efﬁciently. But the
wage does matter for the recruiting effort of employers. If the wage is toward the
lower end of the bargaining set, employers will gain more from the relationship and
will put a higher level of resources into trying to form employment relationships.
Shimer (2004) discusses this mechanism at a more general level; it does not require
the speciﬁc ideas put forth in my other paper.
In the efﬁcient matching-sticky-wage view, a recession is a time when the ﬂow
ofjobseparationsdeclinessomewhat—becausetheﬂowisdeterminedefﬁciently—
but when the wage is unusually high in the bargaining set. A recession could be
triggered by a spontaneous rise in the wage or by an adverse technology or cost
shock that lowered proﬁtability. Firms shift toward less aggressive recruiting and
the job-ﬁnding rate falls accordingly. Unemployment rises, because the small de-
cline in the ﬂow of separations is more than offset by lower job-ﬁnding rates among
the unemployed and by lower likelihoods of job-job transitions without unemploy-
ment.
2 The Irrelevance of Turnover Dynamics
Let u be the unemployment rate, f be the exit rate (the fraction of unemployed
workers in one month who are not unemployed in the next month), and s the entry
rate (the number of newly unemployed as a fraction of employment). With the
labor force normalized at 1, the law of motion for the unemployment rate is
ut = (1 ¡ ft¡1)ut¡1 + st¡1 (1 ¡ ut¡1) (1)
To measure the exit and entry rates, I use data on unemployment by duration.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports the number of unemployed searchers who
began unemployment in the four weeks preceding the survey and also the number
who began 5 to 14 weeks before the survey and remain unemployed. If the exit
rate is a constant over duration (probably a reasonable approximation for relatively
short durations) and the weekly inﬂow to unemployment is a constant (a very good
approximation, as I will show), the ratio of unemployment in the two duration
categories is
41 + ¢¢¢ + (1 ¡ f)4
(1 ¡ f)5 + ¢¢¢ + (1 ¡ f)14 (2)
I solve for the exit rate by equating this expression to the observed ratio of unem-
ployment in the two categories. The entry rate is the unemployment rate in the 0
to 4 week category divided by 1 + ¢¢¢ + (1 ¡ f)4. I will discuss the resulting time
series for the exit and entry rates shortly.
If the exit and entry rates are constant, then equation 1 describes a two-state





If turnover dynamics were an important part of the story of the movements of un-
employment, then the stationary level of unemployment would lead the movements
of actual unemployment. For example, during a period of higher ﬂows into unem-
ployment from job losses at the beginning of a recession, unemployment builds up
to its new higher level, then recedes to its normal level after the inﬂow returns to
normal. But the lead is tiny, because the exit rate is 30 to 60 percent per month.
Figure 1 demonstrates the irrelevance of turnover dynamics. It compares the actual
movements of unemployment to the movements of the stationary level, evaluated
at the current estimates of the entry and exit rates.
Hall (1995) and Cole and Rogerson (1999) noted earlier that unemployment
movements have almost nothing to do with turnover dynamics. For my purposes in
this paper, I achieve a considerable simpliﬁcation by considering only the stochas-
tic stationary state and ignoring turnover dynamics. Almost nothing is lost from
this simpliﬁcation.
3 Model
Here I develop a model that embodies the mechanisms that concern the paper. The
model has three variants. The ﬂexible-wage, efﬁcient-separations variant is essen-
tially the DMP model. The sticky-wage, efﬁcient separations variant follows my
companion paper, Hall (2005), in making the wage unresponsive to current con-



















































































































Figure 1. Irrelevance of Turnover Dynamics
6the DMP model. The sticky-wage, inefﬁcient-separations variant follows the tradi-
tional literature on wage stickiness starting with Keynes, where privately inefﬁcient
layoffs occur when the wage is too high.
The model describes the stationary equilibrium of the labor market. It is sta-
tionary in two senses. First, the environment is stationary—the driving forces are
not changing over time. Present values of future ﬂows are formed on the assump-
tion that the ﬂows will always have their current values. Second, in line with the
evidence in the previous section, the model considers only the stochastic equilib-
rium of the matching process and not its dynamics.
I assume that a worker with tenure on a job of t periods contributes proﬁt
ze¡±t: (4)
Here z incorporates the product price, productivity, and the cost of non-labor in-
puts; it is the driving force of ﬂuctuations. I assume that the rate of decline of proﬁt,
±, is positive. In a simple model with homogeneous workers, the proﬁt generated
byaworkermusteventuallydeclineenoughtoexplainturnover—ifproﬁtremained
constant with tenure or rose, jobs would last forever. My assumption is needed to
generate a positive ﬂow of separations in the stationary state. In a market with het-
erogeneous workers, some—those who were outgrowing their jobs—would face
declining productivity in their current jobs relative to their potential productivity in
other jobs. These are the workers who would separate. Other workers would enjoy
constant or rising productivity. Their comparative advantage in their current jobs
would remain positive or grow and they would not separate. Dealing with this kind
of heterogeneity would vastly complicate the model.
Workers may change jobs without becoming unemployed. I assume that an
employed worker faces a hazard fE of encountering another employer. Because
the worker’s contribution will be higher for the new employer, trilateral efﬁciency
calls for the worker to move to the new employer.
3.1 Values associated with employment and unemployment
The value that a worker associates with a job, apart from the wages the job pays,
is the present value of the likelihood of moving directly to a new job and receiv-
ing E plus the present value of moving to unemployment, with resulting value U,
7after the job ends L periods from its inception, in the event that no job-job tran-
sition occurs. The probability distribution of the duration of the job is a density
fE exp(¡fEj) for duration j < L together with mass exp(¡fEL) at j = L. The
worker receives value E from a job-job transition before duration L and U from a











E + e¡(r+fE)LU (5)
Here r is the discount rate.
Let W be the lowest wage value that a searcher will accept. W equates the
total value of employment to the value of remaining unemployed:
W + V = U (6)
The value a worker associates with a new job paying wages with a present value of
W is
E = V + W = U + W ¡ W: (7)
An employer achieves a value W from the relationship with a newly hired
worker. W is the present discounted value of the earnings stream z exp(¡±j)
received with probability exp(¡fEj):
W =
z





Thus the net value to the employer after paying wages with a present value of W is
J = W ¡ W: (9)





. Any wage value in the bargaining set will result in efﬁcient for-
mation of job matches.
An unemployed worker achieves a present value U from the ﬂow value of
leisure and unemployment compensation, ¸, and from the prospect of ﬁnding a
8job with a value E. The hazard of ﬁnding a job while unemployed is fS, so the
probability density of the time to ﬁnd a job, ¿, is fS exp(¡fS¿) and the probability





I next consider the optimal duration of a job, L. The joint value from a job is
the present value of the output produced plus the beneﬁt from moving directly to







e¡(r+fE)jdj + e¡(r+fE)LU (11)
The ﬁrst-order condition for maximizing this value with respect to job duration L
is
ze¡(r+fE+±)L + fEEe¡(r+fE)L ¡ (r + fE)e¡(r+fE)LU (12)
or
ze¡±L + fEE = (r + fE)U (13)
This equation describes the job duration L where the pair should separate if the
worker has still not come in contact with a new employer. The equation governs
separations in the ﬂexible-wage, efﬁcient-separations and sticky-wage, efﬁcient-
separations variants of the model
For the sticky-wage, inefﬁcient-separations variant, I consider an alternative,
privately inefﬁcient rule for ending jobs: There is a predetermined ﬂow wage w
and the job ends when a worker’s current contribution to proﬁt falls to the level of
the wage:
w = ze¡±L (14)
This rule embodies the governance principle often assumed for the employment
relationship: Employers make unilateral choices about continuing employment,
considering only their own proﬁt, with the wage taken as given.
Employers control the resources that govern the rates of job ﬁnding for em-
ployed workers and for the unemployed. The incentive to deploy the resources
is the employer’s net value from a match, J. I posit two functions, ÁS and ÁE,
mapping this incentive to the matching hazards in the model:
9fE = ÁE(J) (15)
fS = ÁS(J) (16)
These functions describe the outcome in terms of matching hazards for workers
when employers engage in recruiting activities up to the point where the marginal
beneﬁt, indexed by J, equals the marginal cost of the activities (controlled by vari-
ables that are implicit in the functions). These activities could include posting
vacancies (Mortensen 1982, Pissarides 1985), or evaluating candidates. Vacancies
are not an explicit element of the model, but the setup is exactly compatible with
the standard Mortensen-Pissarides setup with vacancies and a matching function
that depends on unemployment and vacancies. When J is higher, ﬁrms post more
vacancies, get in touch with more workers, unemployed and employed, advertise
for more workers, and so on. All of these make it easier for the unemployed to ﬁnd
new jobs and more likely that an employed worker will move to a new and more
productive job.
Notice that the functions ÁS and ÁE describe more than employers’ unilateral
responses to the incentive to ﬁnd new workers. Search involves externalities. The
functions describe the job-ﬁnding hazards facing workers when employers make
decisions about recruiting effort reﬂecting the external effects from the efforts of
other employers.
In the sticky-wage variants of the model, I take the per-period ﬂow wage, w, to
be a state variable. I do not deal here with the law of motion of the wage— Hall
(2005) gives an example of persistent but not total wage rigidity.







+ ~ W (17)




. ~ W is a predeter-
mined amount paid at the beginning of employment. I will discuss its role further
in the section on calibration.
In the ﬂexible-wage variant, I adopt the symmetric Nash wage bargain of DMP.









The wage is set so that its present value, W, is the average of the worker’s reser-
vation value, W, and the employer’s reservation value, W. Although it is possible
to implement this present value in terms of a contingent ﬂow wage, the ﬂow wage
plays no role in the model.
Wage determination for on-the-job search in the ﬂexible-wage variant of the
model is a more complicated issue, because it involves three parties, the earlier em-
ployer, the new employer, and the worker. Burdett and Mortensen (1998), Postel-
Vinay and Robin (2002), and Shimer (2003) deal with the trilateral issue explicitly.
To keep this exposition simple, I will make the assumption that the conventions of
the labor market require that a worker who has come in contact with a prospec-
tive new employer while still working for an earlier employer quit her existing job
before negotiating wages with the new employer. The outcome of the resulting
bilateral bargain is in the bargaining set for the trilateral bargain, so the assumption
is no more than an equilibrium selection rule. The assumption implies that a job
found by on-the-job search has the same present value of wages, W, as one found
during a spell of unemployment.
3.2 Equilibrium
A stationary equilibrium of the model is a pre-wage worker job value, E, a post-
wage worker job value, V , an unemployment value, U, a worker reservation wage,
W, an employer job value, J, an employer reservation wage, W, a job-duration
limit, L, a job-ﬁnding rate for employed workers, fE, and a job-ﬁnding rate for
unemployed workers, fS. For all three variants of the model, these values must
satisfy equations (5) through (10), (15), and (16).
For the ﬂexible-wage, efﬁcient-separations variant of the model, the present
value of actual wages and the two reservation wages must satisfy equation (18)
and the values must satisfy the efﬁcient separation condition of equation (13). For
the sticky-wage variants, the present value of the ﬂow wage, w, is held ﬁxed and
the present value of the wage satisﬁes equation (17). In the sticky-wage, efﬁcient-
separations variant, the values satisfy the efﬁcient separation condition of equation
11(13). In the sticky-wage, inefﬁcient-separations variant, the values satisfy the uni-
lateral proﬁt-maximization condition of equation (14).
All variants have 10 variables and 10 equations.
3.3 Calibration
I calibrate the ﬂexible-wage, efﬁcient-separations variant of the model because I
believe that the sticky wage converges slowly to something like the Nash wage
bargain—wages are sticky but not permanently rigid.
In the calibration, I take the proﬁtability z to be 1, so all values are measured
in units of the monthly proﬁt obtained from the work of one newly-hired worker.
I take the monthly interest rate to be r = 0:05=12. I take the rate of decline of
a worker’s proﬁtability to be ± = 0:008, a value that gives a reasonable value
of ¸ (so in effect I am calibrating to ¸). For the overall separation rate, s, I use
the value from the turnover survey for 2000, 3.5 percent. I obtain the on-the-job
search hazard fE by subtracting an estimate of the employment-unemployment
hazard from the total separation rate. The estimate comes from Blanchard and
Diamond’s (1990) study of turnover data in the Current Population Survey. They
ﬁnd a monthly hazard of 2.9 percent for transitions out of employment, either to
unemployment or out of the labor force. Thus I use fE = :006. A similar calibra-
tion (Moscarini 2003) reports a total separation hazard of 3.5 percent and job-job
transition rate of 1.2 percent.
Fallick and Fleischman (2001)’s direct tabulation of transitions in the Current
Population Survey gives rather higher overall hazards. These authors, in Table 2
of their paper, report a total separation hazard of 6.7 percent, about double the
rate in the employer-based turnover survey. They ﬁnd a job-job transition hazard
of 2.7 percent. I believe that the CPS tends to overstate turnover, despite major
improvements in the survey method, though the large discrepancy remains a topic
for further research.
To measure the job-ﬁnding rate for searchers, fS, I follow Blanchard and Dia-
mond’s suggestion to combine people who are unemployed and those who are not
in the labor force but want a job. The job-ﬁnding hazards are 25 percent per month
for the unemployed and 34 percent for those who want jobs. The combined hazard
is fS = 0:29. Notice that combining the two groups implies an unemployment
12rate, 9.1 percent, that is rather higher than the standard unemployment rate.
Based on these values, I calculate the job-duration limit, L, from the principle

















The resulting value is L = 31:3 months.
I assume that the job-ﬁnding hazard functions are linear and proportional, with
slopes ÁS and ÁE
Isolvethelinearsystemcomprisingequations(5)through(10), (13), (15), (16),
and (19) for the values of ¸, ÁE, ÁS, E, V , U, W, J, W, and W. The value of the
leisure-unemployment compensation parameter ¸ is 0.35 or 35 percent of a newly-
hired worker’s proﬁtability. The slopes of the recruiting functions are ÁS = 0:197
and ÁE = 0:0040. The employer’s job value J is 1.50 months of the proﬁt earned
from a newly hired worker.
I adapt the calibration to the sticky-wage variants of the model in the following
ways: For the efﬁcient-separations case, I set ~ W to zero and calculate the ﬁxed
value of the ﬂow wage, w, to satisfy equation (17) at the value of W from the
ﬂexible-wage calibration. As a result, the sticky-wage, efﬁcient-separations vari-
ant has the same stationary point as the ﬂexible-wage variant, given the calibrated
inputs. For the inefﬁcient-separations case, I set the ﬁxed value of the ﬂow wage,
w, to satisfy the unilateral proﬁt-maximization condition for L in equation (14).
This wage is lower than the wage for the efﬁcient-separations variant, so I set ~ W
to a positive value that makes up the difference in equation (17). As a result, the
inefﬁcient-separations variant shares the same stationary point as the other two
variants.
3.4 Comparative statics
Figure 2 illustrates the determination of the stationary equilibrium in terms of the
supply and demand for recruiting effort, measured on the horizontal axis as the job-
13ﬁnding rate for searchers, fS. The vertical axis is the value, J, that the employer
derives from the relationship at the time it is formed. The supply curve in all three
variants is equation 16:
fS = ÁS(J): (21)
Ahigherjob-valueJ causesemployerstoincreasetheirrecruitingefforts. They
move to a new point where the marginal private value of effort equals the marginal
private return. The supply curve is a straight line from the origin under my assump-
tion about the functional form for ÁE. In the background, the job-ﬁnding rate fE
for employed workers changes along the supply curve as well.
The demand curve encapsulates the rest of the model. In the ﬂexible-wage
case, in the top panel of the ﬁgure, the demand curve slopes steeply downward.
A tighter market (on the right side of the ﬁgure, with a higher job-ﬁnding rate)
with less matching friction results in a lower level of match capital. The employer
receives half the value of the match capital, so the incentive to recruit is smaller in
a tighter market.
In the sticky-wage, efﬁcient-separations variant, shown in the middle panel, the
demand curve is ﬂat because a tighter labor market with a higher job-ﬁnding rate
is more efﬁcient. The job-job transition rate, fE, is higher in the tighter market
and the tenure level, L, where workers automatically depart, is lower. On both
accountsworkersstayontheirjobsforshorterperiodsandthushavehigheraverage
productivity. The present value of their wages rises by almost the same amount.
The net beneﬁt to the employer varies only slightly along the demand curve, so it
is ﬂat.
The demand curve for the sticky-wage, inefﬁcient-separations variant, shown
in the bottom panel, is quite similar to the one for the sticky-wage, efﬁcient-
separations variant. Here, the cutoff tenure level, L, remains the same at all points
on the demand curve, according to equation (14), but the resulting difference from
the efﬁcient-separations case is small.
Figure 2 also shows shifts in the demand curves caused by a one-percent re-
duction in proﬁtability z. The resulting downward shift is substantial for the
sticky-wage demand curves. Employers bear the full brunt of the decline when
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Figure 2. Supply and Demand, with Shifts from a One-Percent Decline in
Productivity (Dashed Lines)
15proﬁtability—from a drop in productivity, a drop in the product price, or a rise in
other costs—results in a large decline in the job-ﬁnding rate and rise in unemploy-
ment. By contrast, with a ﬂexible wage, the shift in the demand curve is tiny. The
decline in proﬁtability causes a corresponding decline in the wage and little effect
on the incentive to hire. Job-ﬁnding and unemployment rates are hardly different.
Table 1 describes the responses of the three versions of the model to a one-
percent decline in proﬁtability, z. The table shows the derivatives of the equilib-
rium with respect to the proﬁtability variable, z, evaluated at the calibrated point.
For all variables except the unemployment rate, the derivatives are normalized as
elasticities.
The negative shock has a large negative effect on the two job-ﬁnding rates,
fE and fS, in the sticky-wage models, for the reasons just explained. It also has
a smaller but non-trivial negative effect on job-ﬁnding rates in the ﬂexible-wage
model. The effects of the shock on the job duration limit, L, are small in the
efﬁcient-separations models—slightly negative with sticky wages and slightly pos-
itivewithﬂexiblewages—butstronglynegativeintheinefﬁcient-separationmodel.
With a ﬁxed wage but diminished proﬁtability, workers lose their jobs. This effect
is the essence of the traditional view of employment ﬂuctuations.




1 ¡ e¡fEL; (22)
and the job-job hazard, fE (note that if the job-job hazard is zero, s = 1=L). The
table shows important differences in the response of the total separation rate to the
adverse shock. In the sticky-wage, efﬁcient-separations model, the job-job hazard,
fE, falls dramatically and the job-duration limit L falls a little, so separations into
unemployment fall in proportion to the decline in proﬁtability—the elasticity is -
1. In the ﬂexible-wage model, the job-job hazard rate also falls, but not nearly as
much. Job duration remains essentially the same, so the total separation rate falls,
but only a little. In the inefﬁcient-separations model, the job-job hazard falls al-
most as much as in the sticky-wage, efﬁcient-separations model of the ﬁrst column,
but the large decline in job duration swamps that effect and causes total separations
to decline by 2.3 times the decline in proﬁtability. Thus rising separations in reces-



















unemployed Elasticity -15.1 -0.9 -14.2
L Job duration Elasticity -0.4 0.0 -4.0
s
Total separation 




rate Derivative 1.4 0.1 1.7
J
Value of job 
match to 
employer Elasticity -15.1 -0.9 -14.2
U
Worker's value 
when unemployed Elasticity -0.9 -1.0 -0.9
E
Worker's value at 
start of
employment Elasticity -0.8 -1.0 -0.8
Model
Table 1. Responses of the Three Models to a One-Percent Decline in Proﬁtability
17sions is the signature of the inefﬁcient-separations model that distinguishes it from
the efﬁcient-separations cases.
Both sticky-wage models generate substantial increases in unemployment, as
the next line in the table shows. As Shimer (2005) has stressed, ﬂexible-wage
models in the DMP tradition cannot explain the magnitude of unemployment vari-
ations. This principle carries over to the model developed here—the addition of
on-the-job search does not erode Shimer’s conclusion.
The last three lines in the table show the responses of the values achieved by
employers and workers. The net value of the match to the employer, J, is highly
sensitive to the adverse shock in the sticky-wage models. This key feature of the
model explains the decline in job-ﬁnding rates that occurs during a recession. The
elasticity of -0.9 in the ﬂexible-wage model is not nearly big enough to generate
realistic recessions from shocks of likely magnitude—it takes an elasticity greater
than 10 in magnitude.
On the other hand, all models generate elasticities of about one for the response
of the worker’s values, U and E, to changes in proﬁtability. Labor is the sole factor
of production in the model and is supplied inelastically, so these values capitalize
almost all of the proﬁt available from production. This property does not mean
that unemployed workers face unchanging incentives to ﬁnd jobs. That incentive is
controlled by E ¡U, which moves in mirror image to J. If wage stickiness results
in a diminished share of the surplus to employers, it also results in an increased
share of the surplus to newly hired workers. The essence of the sticky-wage expla-
nation of ﬂuctuations in the labor market is the asymmetric response to incentives.
When the wage is relatively high in the bargaining set, searchers face increased in-
centives to ﬁnd jobs, but they have no opportunity to increase their job-ﬁnding rates
by spending resources to make up for the diminished incentives facing recruiting
employers.
Early in the paper I suggested that one can understand the changes that occur in
a recession in the labor market without considering turnover dynamics. One aspect
of turnover dynamics does bear mentioning, however. In the inefﬁcient-separations
model, the decline in job duration that occurs when proﬁtability falls means that the
workers with tenure between the old and new values of L lose their jobs when the
shock hits. The data reveal this phenomenon as a spike in layoffs. No such spike
would occur with efﬁcient separations. So one of the ways to gauge the importance
18of inefﬁcient separations is to examine the behavior of layoffs at the beginnings of
recessions.
4 Evidence
4.1 Separations and layoffs
Beginning in December 2000, the Bureau of Labor Statistics has collected data
on separations and hires for a large sample of employers. Fortuitously, the early
months of the new survey caught the labor market just before the peak of employ-
ment, so the period of the survey to date describes the differences between a strong
market and a weak market. The extended unemployment rate rose from 6.9 percent
in December 2000 to 9.1 percent in August 2003.
Todate, theBLShasnotdevelopedseasonaladjustmentfactorsforallofthese-
ries in the new survey. I have calculated rough seasonal adjustments with monthly
dummies. Figure 3 shows the turnover rates recorded in the survey. Most remark-
able is the behavior of the separation rate. Except for a bulge following September
11, 2001, layoffs remained almost exactly constant from the peak of the market in
December 2000 through the end of 2002, a period of continuing declines in em-
ployment and rising unemployment. The recession did not begin with a burst of
job loss. Quits did decline later in the contraction, in accord with standard beliefs
about what happens in the labor market during recessions, so total separations fell
modestly.
Figure 3 suggests that the sticky-wage, inefﬁcient-separations model does not
describe the modern U.S. labor market at all. Despite a large increase in unem-
ployment, separations fell. There was no burst of layoffs at any time.
The turnover survey gives an unambiguous picture of the behavior of sepa-
rations in a recession, in the economy of 2000 and later. Its only defect is lack
of history. Another economy-wide source of data on ﬂows in the labor market is
the Current Population Survey. The CPS does not measure departures from jobs
directly. It reveals related information by comparisons of the status of the same
people in two adjacent months. Job-to-job transitions are almost impossible to
measure because they can be detected only if one job is coded into a different

















































































Figure 4. Flows into Unemployment
ployment to unemployment and to activities out of the labor market. See Blanchard
and Diamond (1990) for further discussion and cites to the earlier literature.
Figure 4 shows the results of the calculation described in Section 2 of sepa-
rations in the sense of entry to unemployment as measured in the Current Pop-
ulation Survey. NBER recessions are shown at the bottom. The ﬂow has large
low-frequency movements, rising to a peak in 1982 and then falling to its histori-
cal low in the last year reported, 2003. There is no sign of important increases in
inﬂows to unemployment in the two most recent recessions, in 1990-91 and 2001.
Earlier recessions, especially 1948-49 and 1981-82, did show bursts of entry to
unemployment.
Figure 5 conﬁrms the suspicion that the lack of a burst of job loss in recessions
is a recent development. For years starting in 1977, it breaks down new unem-
ployment by source. Job loss from both temporary layoff and other sources—
permanent loss of jobs and the ending of temporary jobs—rose dramatically in the
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Figure 5. Components of Flows into Unemployment
22The behavior of inﬂows to unemployment does not contradict the turnover sur-
veyfor2001andlater. Someworkerswholosejobsdonotbecomeunemployedbut
move to new jobs directly. The job-job transition rate is a close cousin of the job-
ﬁnding rate for searchers. As I will show in a moment, that rate falls precipitately
in a recession. The modest increase in inﬂows of job losers to unemployment in
2001 is probably entirely the result of a higher likelihood of unemployment among
job losers and not higher separations from jobs.
Another source of information about ﬂows in the labor market is the tabulation
of plant-level employment changes pioneered by Davis and Haltiwanger (1992).
These authors measure what they call job destruction as the sum of employment
declines across plants. They ﬁnd that job destruction spikes during recessions. But
job destruction does not measure separations—rather, it measures separations less
new hires in plants where the difference is positive. Job destruction does not dis-
tinguish employment reductions that occur because of failure to replace normal
attrition, from employment reductions that occur because of actual separations. In
any period of declining employment, job destruction necessarily rises unless a sur-
prising and unlikely change occurs in the shape of the distribution of employment
changes across employers. In a model governed by the principle of efﬁcient separa-
tions, and with heterogeneity across plants, job destruction would rise in response
to a shock that caused a decline in employment, even though separations remained
constant. Consequently, there is no contradiction between the ﬁnding of no spike
in separations in recession with Davis and Haltiwanger’s ﬁnding of a spike in job
destruction.
I have investigated whether changes in the nature of recessions might explain
the lack of a burst of layoffs in the recession of 2001. I tabulated the change in pay-
roll employment by 11 major industry groups from the peak to the trough months
of the recessions in the NBER chronology starting with 1948-49. I calculated the
average change for all 10 recessions. The result is the cross-industry signature of
the typical recession. For example, construction employment falls by 5.5 percent,
durables manufacturing by 11.4 percent, and nondurables by 4.2 percent. Other
employment changes are smaller and a number of service industries and the gov-
ernment grow in the typical recession. Then I calculated the cross-industry corre-
lation of the employment changes for each recession with the industry pattern for














Table 2. Cross-industry correlations of peak-to-trough employment changes in 10
recessions
All of the correlations are high. The pattern of employment change by industry
is similar across all 10 recessions. The least typical recession was 1990-91. Manu-
facturing employment fell by much less than usual in that recession. The recession
of 2001 was more typical—the only important departure from the usual pattern
was that construction employment fell by only 1.2 percent in 2001. I conclude that
the industry pattern of employment changes is not an important difference in the
recession tracked in JOLTS relative to earlier recessions.
In summary, the evidence on separations suggests that inefﬁcient separations
are not an important phenomenon in the modern U.S. economy. In particular, the
decline in total separations that occurred in the recession that began in early 2001
accords closely with the efﬁcient-separations model and gives no support to the
inefﬁcient-separations model. But earlier contractions probably did see bursts of
job loss of the type predicted only by the inefﬁcient-separations model. Because
the most suitable data for measuring separations became available only in 2000, it














































Figure 6. Job-Finding Rate Measured as the Ratio of New Hires to Extended
Unemployment
4.2 Job-ﬁnding rates
Time-series data on job-ﬁnding rates are lacking. The turnover survey does not
distinguish between new hires from unemployment and new hires directly from
earlier jobs. This distinction would not be practical in an employer-based survey.
The Current Population Survey does not generally track job changes.
The data I discussed in the calibration section suggest that most new hires are
from the unemployed (in the extended sense of this paper). Of the total outﬂow
of workers from jobs of 3.5 percent per month, 2.9 percentage points are ﬂows
into unemployment, (Blanchard and Diamond 1990). In stochastic equilibrium,
the same ratio must govern the inﬂows—a ratio of 2.9/3.5 of hires are from the
unemployed. Consequently, the ratio of hires to unemployment is indicative of
job-ﬁnding rates. Figure 6 shows the ratio for the period covered by the turnover
survey.
25The job-ﬁnding rate declined from 45 percent per month to 30 percent over
the period. There can be no question that the labor market softened substantially as
the recession developed. It seems altogether likely that both the job-ﬁnding rate for
searchers, fS, and the rate for the employed, fE, fell during the period. Further, the
magnitude of the decline appears inconsistent with the elasticity of the job-ﬁnding
rate with respect to the proﬁtability driving force given in Table 1 for the ﬂexible-
wage model. The elasticity is 0.8, so the driving variable, z, would need to have
fallen by 42 percent to account for the slackening of the labor market.
Adeclineof42percentinproﬁtabilityiseasytoimagineinaparticularindustry—
say computers in the case of the 2001 recession. But the slackening of the labor
market was economy-wide. The forces that can depress economy-wide proﬁtabil-
ity are circumscribed. One is productivity. It is easy to rule out the possibility
that the recession was caused by a 42-percent decline in productivity. The other is
an adverse shift in the terms of trade. The shift was adverse in the recession, but
nowhere near large enough to depress z by 42 percent. Finally, an increase in the
wage above its Nash-bargain level has essentially the same effect as a decline in z.
So a third possibility is a large spontaneous increase in the wage.
The decline in z needed to explain the decline in the job-ﬁnding rate in the
sticky-wage, efﬁcient-separations model is a more reasonable 3 percent. A reces-
sion of the observed magnitude could be caused by some combination of produc-
tivity declines, shifts in the terms of trade, and overshooting of wages, that summed
to 3 percent.
I conclude that the ﬂexible-wage model cannot account for the substantial de-
cline in the job-ﬁnding rate observed in the 2001 recession. It is a topic for further
research to determine if the sticky-wage model is consistent with the events of the
recession, but sticky wages seem the most promising avenue among those consid-
ered here.
5 Concluding Remarks
The data on ﬂows in the U.S. labor market are informative about the employment
relationship and about changes in the relationship over time. I have considered
two key features of the relationship. One is the efﬁciency of the mechanism used
to determine when matches are made and when they are continued or terminated.
26I showed that the behavior of the separation rate during recessions distinguishes
efﬁcient from inefﬁcient separations—among the models I consider, a jump in sep-
arations during a recession is an unambiguous indicator of inefﬁciency. The data
show that such jumps occurred in earlier recessions, but not those of the past 20
years, including the one that started in 2001. I conclude that modern employment
relationships are generally terminated in the joint interest of the worker and the
employer. I infer, without any direct evidence, that the same principle applies to
the formation of matches as well.
The second key feature is the movement of the wage within the zone consistent
with efﬁciency. The conclusion that separations only occur efﬁciently rules out
wages that are too high to merit retention from the employer’s point of view, or
too low to merit the worker staying on the job, but allows the wage to take on any
value in the bargaining set bounded by those two values. In a labor market with
frictions, there is a substantial gap between the lowest and highest efﬁcient wage.
From the perspective of the worker and employer, the wage is indeterminate in the
bargaining set. An equilibrium selection rule governs the actual choice.
Although the choice of wage in the bilateral employment relationship is in-
determinate, the choice has allocational consequences, because employers make
economic choices about recruiting effort based on their expectations about the res-
olution of the indeterminacy. If they expect the wage to be at the low end of the set,
they will recruit more actively and the labor market will be stronger, in the sense
of higher job-ﬁnding rates for job seekers.
This line of thought results in a role for wage stickiness quite different from the
traditional one resulting in inefﬁcient separations. Its distinctive effect is on job-
ﬁnding rates, not separation rates. When wage stickiness is a factor in a recession,
it is not because workers lose their jobs on account of sticky wages, but because
those who lose their jobs at normal rates experience abnormally low job-ﬁnding
rates.
The data give strong support to the second type of wage stickiness. The re-
cession of 2001 saw a huge decline in the job-ﬁnding rate. Among the models I
consider, only those with sticky wages can explain the decline—it is far too large
to be the result of ﬂexible wages modeled as a Nash bargain.
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